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ABSTRACT
We argue that the evaluation of censorship evasion tools
should depend upon economic models of censorship. We
illustrate our position with a simple model of the costs of
censorship. We show how this model makes suggestions for
how to evade censorship. In particular, from it, we develop
evaluation criteria. We examine how our criteria compare
to the traditional methods of evaluation employed in prior
works.
1. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. In response to government censorship of
the Internet, activists and researchers have deployed
numerous censorship evasion tools [1]. Censors, in
turn, have developed approaches to counter these eva-
sion tools by, for example, blocking all Internet traf-
fic produced from a given tool [16, 11]. Researchers
have responded by proposing numerous improvements
intended to neutralize such blocking (e.g., [19, 14, 18,
20]). Due to limited resources, the developers of eva-
sion tools cannot implement and deploy all of these;
they need criteria for selecting the most promising.
While the evaluation sections of research papers pro-
vide some insight into the promise of each proposal,
each paper employs its own evaluation methodology,
typically selected with the capabilities of the tool in
mind, making cross-tool comparisons difficult. Fur-
thermore, determining how well the evaluation predicts
real-world performance often poses difficulties. Proto-
typed tools meeting evaluation criteria are sometimes
easily broken using methods unconsidered by the eval-
uation [8].
In this paper, we provide a preliminary examination
of a different framework for evaluation with hopes of
generating interest in evaluation issues. We propose
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augmenting prior tool-specific methods of evaluation
with a new methodology for creating evaluation crite-
ria and interpreting results. We start from the premise
that censors and evaders engage in an ongoing arms race
whose ebb and flow is largely determined by economic
concerns. Thus, we argue we should evaluate tools on
their promise to drive up the costs of the censor while
remaining inexpensive to implement.
From this prospective, tool-specific evaluations be-
come important evidence that a tool could drive up a
censor’s costs. Our perspective addresses the above-
mentioned shortcoming of prior evaluations in two ways.
First, by examining total cost, we remind the evaluator
that every aspect of the traffic produced by the eva-
sion tool matters, not simply those considered by its
designer. We hope this universal view will encourage
designers to widen their focus and catch the often sim-
ple attacks that foiled past approaches.
Second, by potentially providing a numerical score,
cost can reflect a more quantitative measure than seeing
whether a tool can be broken by any means, a standard
more appropriate when a clear winner is possible (e.g.,
cryptographic protocols) than an arms race.
Overview. After motivating our arms-race view of
censorship and the need for considering costs, we turn
our attention to illustrating the use of our methodology.
Our illustration is preliminary and focuses on only one
side of the equation, the costs to the censor, leaving the
evader’s costs to future work.
Our illustration starts with a simple model of the
censor’s costs. The model emphasizes the ability of the
censor to employ any feature of network traffic, not just
those on which the tool is evaluated. Given the paucity
of information regarding the budgets of real censors, our
model must leave the actual costs as unknown param-
eters. Thus, we cannot use our model to predict actual
costs. Despite this limitation, we use it to reason about
whether a particular design choice increases costs (by
some undetermined amount).
We find that these qualitative results suggest econom-
ically motivated evaluation criteria for evasion tools. In-
formally, we judge a tool by the number of inexpensive
features it obfuscates. We estimate the expense of a
feature using surrogates for the actual costs faced by
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the censor.
We examine three prior approaches under these crite-
ria and find that each is narrowly focused. We also use
our model to explain the effectiveness of active manip-
ulation, attacks during which the censor interacts with
an evasion tool, rather than just passively watching its
traffic. We conclude that, in the case of a blacklisting
censor, looking different from known disallowed traffic
is a better choice than mimicking allowed protocols. We
end with a discussion of open questions.
2. PRIORWORK
Some previous research considered cost of a cen-
sor as a result of different circumvention methods.
Houmansadr et al. determined that evading decoy rout-
ing would increase a censor’s cost in terms of network
latency and path length [10]. Elahi et al. proposed the
CORDON taxonomy that divides different censorship
evasion strategies into six types according to their ef-
fects on a censor [4]. We model costs of the censor for
detecting traffic obfuscation tools.
Roberts et al. evaluated tools by testing whether they
work in various countries [16]. Callanan et al. used
a combination of in-laboratory tests and user surveys
to determine the usability, performance, and security
characteristics of a variety of tools [1]. By using com-
mon methods on tools in their environment, these re-
searchers were able to compare the current success of
deployed tools. However, researchers and developers
need criteria applicable to undeployed tools. They must
carefully select which proposals to develop and deploy
due the costs associated with such efforts. Also, cri-
teria based on surveys include factors other than the
technical merits of an approach. For example, a tool
may have high adoption due to having first-mover ad-
vantage or popular proponents. Alternatively, a tool
might be unblocked despite being easily blocked since
the tool is too unpopular to warrant the censor’s atten-
tion. We desire evaluation criteria that rate tools upon
their technical merits.
Others have explored absolute characterizations of
success. For example, Pfitzmann and Hansen use unde-
tectability, or unobservability, to mean that the censor
should not be able to determine which Internet users are
using the evasion tool and use unblockability to mean
that the censor should not be able to block the tool’s
traffic without also blocking a great deal of unrelated
traffic [15]. However, perfectly achieving these goals
typically leads to unacceptably high performance degra-
dation. Thus, undetectability and unblockability are
only approximated by tools attempting to increase the
censor’s numbers of false negatives and false positives,
respectively.
Dingledine enumerates general properties that make
for a good evasion tool [2]. We focus on lower-level cri-
teria specific to a tool not being blocked and on the jus-
tification of the criteria in terms of an economic model.
None the particular evaluations used by various tool
developers were designed to be applicable to multiple
tools. We discuss them in Section 6, where we compare
their evaluations to our own criteria.
Houmansadr et al. empirically come to a similar con-
clusion as we do: tools mimicking allowed protocols are
ill-advised [8]. They support their position by showing
that censors can easily identify such mimicking tools.
We explore the issue using a formal model.
3. THE ARMS RACE
When an evader deploys a sufficiently successful eva-
sion tool, an effected censor typically improves its sys-
tem to catch use of the tool. Thus, the two sides are
engaged in an arms race. With this in mind, evasion
tools should be designed to slow the censor down and
to cost it resources.
To illustrate this arms race and motivate the con-
sideration of costs, we consider the two most popu-
lar approaches that evaders take, polymorphism and
steganography, and the possible responses of the cen-
sors. Before doing so, we provide background on the
censor and evader. We focus on Tor-based evasion
tools [3] and presume familiarity with Tor’s use as such.
Censors and Evaders. A censor disallows some sub-
set of messages. It employs a classifier that examines
network traffic and attempts to identify those pack-
ets facilitating a disallowed message. The classifier
typically uses hand-crafted signatures that character-
ize disallowed traffic (a blacklist) or allowed traffic (a
whitelist). We focus on blacklisting censors as they are
more common [11]. We consider the classifier missing a
disallowed message to be a false negative and acciden-
tally blocking an allowed message to be a false positive.
The signatures in the blacklist refer to the value of
various features of the traffic. These features can de-
pend upon a single packet, such as IP address or the des-
tination’s domain name; upon distributions over more
than one packet, such as the distribution of interpacket
arrival times and packet lengths within a packet flow;
or upon the sequence of packets within a flow, requir-
ing the keeping of state. Distributional and stateful
features tend to be more costly since they require more
storage and computation [12].
A censor can identify disallowed traffic either by pas-
sive monitoring or by active manipulation. Whereas
monitoring simply watches traffic, active manipulation
involves the censor sending traffic to a suspected evader.
For example, the evader can send manipulated requests
to the evader to study its reaction. Active attacks can
allow the censor to drive the evader toward more rec-
ognizable traffic, which we discuss more in Section 7.
We view an evasion tool as a transformation on the
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network traffic that the censor attempts to classify.
Since censors typically consider any traffic employing
an evasion tool as disallowed, we only consider trans-
formations that alter only disallowed traffic. (Transfor-
mations on allowed traffic could be possible with help
from, for example, ISPs, but we leave such considera-
tions to future work.) Thus, the tool can transform the
features examined by the censor in a manner that drives
up false negatives, but not false positives.
If an evader drives up the number of false negatives
unacceptably high, the censor will respond with a new
classifier. The classifier could be altered to recognize
the new values produced by disallowed messages under
the old features or to employ new features that remain
unobfuscated by the evader. The classifier may intro-
duce false positives by attempting to block the tool too
aggressively. Thus, tools can indirectly cause false pos-
itives.
Let us consider two examples of such transformations
with the first motivated by polymorphism and the sec-
ond by steganography. We also consider the censor’s
possible responses to the transformations and how they
affect the expenses of the censor. For simplicity, we
presume the censor’s blacklist starts with a single sig-
nature, which is a threshold on the value that a single
feature takes on.
Polymorphism. Polymorphism is a way of spreading
out behavior. To be polymorphic in a feature means
that the feature takes on multiple values among dif-
ferent instances, such as messages. Spreading out the
values of a feature used in a blacklist’s signature can
result in the signature no longer identifying disallowed
traffic, increasing false negatives (Figure 1).
In response, the censor can either come up with a new
decision boundary using the old feature or employ a new
feature. A new boundary is likely to be more complex
than the old one, making it more difficult to implement
and less likely to generalize to new traffic (e.g., [13]).
Thus, it will typically be less accurate, increasing the
costs of the censor. Using a new feature may require ad-
ditional measurements driving up the operating costs of
the censor. Either way, the censor must spend on the
development effort. For example, many censors (Iran,
China, and Syria) were blocking SSL and, thus, Tor as
it also uses SSL. To circumvent this, Obfsproxy (obfs2)
was implemented that added an extra layer of encryp-
tion on top of Tor with no recognizable byte patterns.
To identify Tor with Obfsproxy the censor either has
to employ a new complex classifier or a new feature.
The new feature could be a passive feature like packet
arrival time or an active feature like the reaction to ac-
tive manipulation [8].
Note that the role of polymorphism in our descrip-
tion differs from that of Tor’s pluggable transports. The
pluggable transports framework allows creating differ-
Evader uses 
Polymorphism
Censor uses 
complex decision 
boundary
Censor adds 
a new feature
Current decision 
boundary
New decision 
boundary Complex decision boundary
Figure 1: Polymorphism. Red stars represent
disallowed traffic and blue circles represent al-
lowed traffic. The dotted line shows the decision
boundary of censor’s classifier.
ent protocols to transform the Tor traffic flow into dif-
ferent formats with the goal of replacing a blocked pro-
tocol quickly. Here, we are envisioning a single protocol
that automatically uses many polymorphic variants si-
multaneously.
Steganography. Steganography is a way of looking
like allowed communications. To be steganographic in
a feature means having values that are very close to the
allowed communications. Since steganography trans-
forms a feature, as with polymorphism, it can result in
unrecognizable disallowed traffic and more false nega-
tives (Figure 2).
In the case of perfect steganography on the feature,
responding by selecting a more complex decision bound-
ary will not help since the traffic is no longer separable
by the altered feature. If the censor keeps relying upon
the altered feature, it has to choose between raising false
negatives or positives.
Alternatively, the censor can add a new feature on
which allowed and disallowed traffic continue to differ,
incurring the cost of implementing and tracking the new
feature. Furthermore, adding such a new feature would
require learning about how the disallowed and allowed
messages differ, which could involve detailed knowledge
of the protocol used by the allowed messages and ap-
proximated by disallowed traffic (the cover protocol).
For example, SkypeMorph transforms Tor traffic to look
similar to Skype traffic by changing the packet length
distribution of Tor traffic. To distinguish real Skype and
mimicked Skype traffic, the censor can check their error
behaviors using knowledge of the Skype protocol [8].
4. THE COSTS OF CENSORSHIP
Motivated by the above examples, we believe that
censorship and censorship evasion has been and will
continue to be an arms race where censors will track
an increasing number of features and evaders will trans-
form an increasing number of them. Since the pace of
this race is set largely by the budgets of each opponent,
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Evader uses Steganography
Censor adds 
a new feature
Current decision
boundary
New decision
boundary
Figure 2: Steganography
technologies that increase the costs of the censor while
not increasing the costs of the evaders should be wel-
comed by the evaders. For this reason, we present a
simple cost model of the censor.
First, we consider the costs that the censor incurs as
a consequence of allowing or disallowing various pack-
ets. Let c(t, a) be the cost to the censor when taking
the action a on a packet of type t where for simplic-
ity the actions are aa for allow and ad for disallow and
the types are ta for allowed or td for disallowed. (Re-
finements are possible.) The censor will pick the action
that minimizes its expected cost given the information
it has on the packet i. That is, it selects
d(i |F ) = argmin
a
∑
t∈T
P (type(i)=t |F (i)) ∗ c(t, a) (1)
where F (i) is the result of computing the features in
the set F on i, T is the set of types, and type(i) is the
type of i. The cost that the censor will incur for i is
C(i |F ) = c(type(i), d(i |F )) (2)
When d(i |F ) is aa but type(i) is td, the censor has a
false negative. We assume that the cost c(td, aa) is pos-
itive since the censor is attempting to block such mes-
sages. When d(i |F ) is ad but type(i) is ta, the censor
has a false positive. We assume that c(ta, ad) is positive
since blocking allowed traffic can disrupt the economy
of the censoring country [17]. The others costs could be
zero or even negative, indicating a reward.
Second, we consider the costs of operating the censor-
ship system. To compute the features in the set F , the
system makes measurements of traffic, such as recording
the packet arrival times or lengths. We model operating
each measurement m as incurring a cost op(m).
We also allow the censorship system to be stateful.
For example, state allows us to model the feature of flow
entropy, which requires making measurements of each
packet in a flow and storing distributional information
for each flow. The operating expenses of a feature due
to storage can depend upon the accuracy to which it is
computed. For example, entropy-based approaches be-
come more accurate as the number of samples increases.
However, sampling, in this case, means waiting for more
packets, which means more storage costs. (Also, if such
packets are sent to their destinations before a decision is
reached, this can lead to those packets being false neg-
atives, also increasing cost.) With these considerations
in mind, we conclude that typically, flow-level features
computed over a distribution of packet-level features
are typically more costly than packet-level features. We
model each feature f as incurring a cost store(f) that
depends upon the amount of memory it requires.
Lastly, we consider development costs. Each new fea-
ture f must be implemented, incurring a cost of imp(f).
For simplicity, we assume that the censor’s system is
updated according to a development cycle of fixed du-
ration. To each cycle, we charge the costs of developing
the classifier used during that cycle and for using it dur-
ing the cycle. The development costs depend upon not
just the set F ′ of features used during the cycle, but also
the set F of features used in the past since previously
used features need not be reimplemented. We denote
the expected total cost as cost(F ′|F, P ) where F ′ are
the features used by the classifier during the cycle, F
are the features previously used, and P is the traffic
distribution. We model the expected total cost as
cost(F ′|F, P ) =
∑
~i
P (~i) ∗
∑
i∈~i
C(i|F ′) (3)
+
∑
m∈meas(F )
op(m) (4)
+
∑
f∈F ′
store(f) (5)
+
∑
f∈F ′−F
imp(f) (6)
where~i ranges over the traffic possible during that cycle
and meas(F ) denotes the set of measurements needed
to compute the features F . The actual cost is computed
by fixing ~i to the actual traffic.
We remind the reader that the above model is not
designed to produce accurate predictions of the censor’s
actual costs. Rather, we keep it simple and abstract
while treating it as point of departure to discuss how to
increase the censor’s relative costs in general. Thus, we
make no effort to estimate any of the costs to which the
model refers. Furthermore, do not claim that our model
captures every cost of the censor. With this model in
mind, we now turn to the approaches that the evasion
tool may use to drive up this cost.
5. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Given that we cannot directly measure the costs ef-
fecting censors, we search for surrogates that protocol
designers can measure and have reason to believe are
correlated with these costs. Such surrogates can serve as
criteria for selecting which research proposals to deploy.
Since we do not empirically demonstrate that these sur-
rogates actually correlate to a censor’s costs, they must
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be considered hypotheses.
For a surrogate of the accuracy of a set of features,
the tool evaluator may test a classifier using those fea-
tures over simulated traffic that includes traffic from
the evaluated tool. The number of lines of code needed
to implement a feature can act as a surrogate for the
its implementation costs. The amount of storage for
each feature serves as a surrogate for storage costs. The
number of measurements needed for all the features is
a surrogate for measurement costs.
Intuitively, the quality of an evasion tool is propor-
tional to the cost of the most inexpensive feature set F
that achieves such a level of quality as demanded by the
censor. Thus, if the evaluator can find an inexpensive
set of features F1 that accurately identifies traffic from a
evasion tool e1 but cannot find an equally or less expen-
sive set of features F2 that accurately identifies traffic
from a tool e2, then the evaluator should suspect that
e2 is a better one than e1. However, the evaluator must
keep in mind that these findings are relative to his abil-
ity to find and test feature sets F and to the method of
estimating the expense of features.
In this way, the creators of tools cannot argue that
their tool achieves some level success since some set of
features might exist that they failed to consider. How-
ever, they can demonstrate the shortcoming of other
tools by illustrating feature sets under which other tools
perform more poorly than their own.
Tool creators can also demonstrate that certain fea-
tures, those obfuscated by their tool, are unlikely to be
useful in crafting attacks against their own tool. By
doing so for inexpensive, well-known features, they can
argue that either unusual or expensive features would
have to be used for an attack against their system.
Thus, a heuristic metric of a tool’s prospects for suc-
cess is the cheapness of the features it obfuscates. For
example, a tool that obfuscates a few very inexpensive
features should be viewed more favorably than a tool
that obfuscates expensive features, even if it obfuscates
more of them.
While computing these surrogates may appear daunt-
ing, those evaluating evasion tools typically implement
and run programs using the features they claim their
tool obfuscates. Thus, they may use their own imple-
mentations to find values for these surrogates.
6. REEVALUATION OF EXISTING TOOLS
In this section, we demonstrate how our evaluation
criteria can be used in practice to guide the develop-
ment process and evaluation of different circumvention
tools. To do this we reevaluate some existing tools using
our evaluation criteria. We examine only the capabil-
ities of these tools as described in each paper’s evalu-
ation; we make no effort to confirm the correctness of
these evaluations or to infer additional capabilities of
the tools.
ScrambleSuit [20] obfuscates Tor traffic by not em-
ploying a telltale TLS handshake used by plain Tor
and by polymorphically randomizing packet lengths and
interpacket arrival times to look different from both
Tor and its own instances. Presuming that the packet
lengths and interpacket arrival times over which it ran-
domizes matches ones seen in allowed traffic, then it
obfuscates these features.
SkypeMorph [14] is a steganography tool to obfuscate
Tor traffic as Skype video calls. In addition to hiding
the TLS handshake, it changes the Tor packet sizes and
interpacket delays to match that of pre-recorded traffic
of a Skype video call. Since Skype traffic is common, it
obfuscates these two features.
StegoTorus is a polymorphic steganographic tool de-
signed to have a diverse set of steganographic modules
allowing the StegoTorus client to use whichever modules
the censor has not yet blocked [18]. Currently, there are
two proof-of-concept steganography modules, one uses
HTTP and another mimics an encrypted peer-to-peer
cover protocol, such as Skype. StegoTorus obfuscates
the TLS handshake, connection length (seconds), con-
nection payload, and per-packet payloads, which corre-
sponds to two measurements since connection payload
and per-packet payload require the same measurement.
While all three obfuscates a small number of inex-
pensive features, some of their effort to obfuscate dis-
tributional features may be misplaced. For example,
StegoTorus and SkypeMorph focus on mimicking dis-
tribution based features but fail to mimic inexpensive
features like error codes, a weakness we discuss next.
7. ACTIVE MANIPULATION
To illustrate the censor’s ability to focus on in-
expensive, simple features, we discuss active ma-
nipulation. Active manipulation aims to increase
P (F (i) | type(i)=td) when type(i) = td by making the
instance behave in a manner that is characteristic of
disallowed traffic while not degrading any of the other
probabilities. To do so, active manipulation engages in
behavior characteristic of an evasion tool that is not
characteristic of any known allowed protocols.
For example, presuming that all Tor traffic is disal-
lowed, the censor could initiate the Tor protocol hand-
shake and observe whether the client producing the in-
stance responds in the manner of Tor. Such manipula-
tions work well since allowed traffic is unlikely to just
so happen to exhibit Tor’s complex behavior meaning
that active manipulation introduces few false positives.
Thus, atypical, complex behaviors are dangerous for
evasion tools as it provides a telltale sign of its use.
Systems like ScrambleSuit that reduces the complexity
of the handshake for those without a password represent
progress [20].
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In Houmansadr et al. [8], they consider a form of
active manipulation for defeating steganographic sys-
tems. It operates in two steps. First, it establishes that
the protocol is very similar to some whitelisted proto-
col in a manner similar to the initiation attack discussed
above. Second, it proves that protocol is not really that
whitelisted protocol by exercising some atypical behav-
ior of the whilelisted protocol.
Using some additional reasoning and replacing
“whitelisted traffic” with “allowed traffic”, the above
manipulation approach may also be used by a blacklist-
ing censor. Intuitively, the above two steps together
show that the protocol is masquerading as another,
which is suspicious enough to warrant blocking since
it is unlikely that allowed traffic would do so. However,
in this case, the evader may respond as in the above at-
tacks by decreasing its complexity to pass as a simple,
unknown protocol, which in this case would mean no
longer attempting to look like a known protocol. Thus,
it appears that polymorphism is a better choice than
steganography in the blacklisting case.
8. DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
The simple cost model presented in this preliminary
proposal has already provided some insights into tool
evaluation. We have provided a proof of concept that
evaluations can be more universally applied and more
closely tied to economics than in the past.
These advantages come with difficulties making our
evaluations more complex than tool-specific ones with
a narrow focus. Furthermore, this preliminary work
leaves some questions open. We consider some below.
(1) Can our cost model be validated? We developed
our cost model primarily through intuition. Ideally, we
would have empirical results showing its accuracy. Fu-
ture work can look at the costs of actual censors in
democratic countries with published budgets to gain in-
sights into their costs. We can also compare our model
to the costs of those engaged in similar arms races, such
as spam detection or network intrusion detection.
(2) How should we select features to examine? The
evaluator might overlook relatively cheap features while
examining ones that the censor never intended to use.
In essence, the evaluations of StegoTorus and Skype-
Morph, by not considering the features considered by
Houmansadr et al. [8], suffered from this trap, which
our methodology highlights but does not prevent. Fu-
ture work can examine past data to estimate the relative
cost of different features by seeing how long it takes for
a censor to adapt to manipulations of them [12]. How-
ever, the open-ended nature of the measurements and
features possible makes it difficult to ever conclude that
an evaluation examined every cheap feature. We expect
dealing with features elicited by manipulation, such as
those used Houmansadr et al. to distinguish StegoTorus
from its cover protocols [8], will be particularly difficult
to characterize.
(3) Do our surrogates reflect the censor’s actual costs?
Answering this question depends upon the answers to
the previous two: our surrogates must be developed
from an accurate cost model and should focus on the
features mostly used by the censor. As a stopgap, our
evaluation heuristic is computed using the features ma-
nipulated by the evasion tool rather than those used
by the censor. Future work can instead subject evasion
tools to a battery of tests based on inexpensive features.
(4) Are all costs equally important for any censorship
regime? Different kind of costs might dominate in dif-
ferent censorship regimes. For example, China seems to
increase censorship during and before specific events like
the anniversary of Tiananmen Square protests, which
suggests that the relative costs of false positives and
negatives varies with the conditions. Other countries
(e.g. Saudi Arabia, Qatar) use computationally-costly
DPI methods rather than using simpler but customized
methods like DNS redirection, as China does [7]. These
countries can easily buy off-the-shelf DPI tools but lack
the skills to build customized tools, which implies that
implementation costs might vary by country.
(5) What should we add to our model? Our cur-
rent model only considers features of packets. Thus,
we cannot fully evaluate tools like Flash Proxy [5] as
it focuses on lowering the cost of creating new proxies
rather than on obfuscating features of traffic. We also
assume that packets do not interact with each other,
which limits our ability to explain attacks leveraging
such interactions. For example, Geddes et al. [6] show
that randomly dropping 5% of the traffic would render
disallowed traffic using Skype as a cover protocol (e.g.,
FreeWave [9] and SkypeMorph [14]) useless without af-
fecting legitimate Skype. This is caused by a channel
mismatch between the cover protocol and the disallowed
protocol: the cover protocols are loss tolerant peer-to-
peer systems whereas the disallowed protocol (Tor) is
a loss intolerant client-proxy system. We cannot model
loss tolerance since we consider each packet in isolation.
(6) What are the trade-offs between the censor’s and
evaders’ costs? Evaluations of evasion tools must also
consider the costs of the evaders. Since evaders separate
out into tool developers and tool users, we may require
two additional cost models. With these models in hand,
we may examine the trade-off between increasing the
censor’s costs and keeping the evaders’ costs acceptable.
Unfortunately, fully understanding these trade-offs may
require models that produce quantitative predictions of
costs allowing us to compare each party’s cost on a com-
mon scale.
In particular, by focusing on the censor’s costs, we
presuppose that the evaders are better off whenever the
censor is worse off. However, this is not always the case.
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For example, an evasion technique that increases the
censor’s false positives but does not result in more disal-
lowed traffic flowing makes the censor worse off without
helping the evader. Alternatively, the censor changing
its opinion on the dangers of disallowed traffic may re-
sult in it blocking less disallowed traffic but without its
costs increasing. Thus, we would like a better under-
standing of when increasing a censor’s costs corresponds
to an improvement for the evader.
While this proposal does not answer these questions,
our overall methodology allows us to systematically con-
sider them. It makes plain that prior evaluations and
our own criteria found in Section 5 must be treated
as heuristics and encourages the evaluator to consider
how they may deviate from the actual quantity of inter-
est, costs. We provide a rigorous methodology in which
to discuss the trade-offs among evasion tools and their
evaluations.
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